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Search and Rescue as a Geopolitics of
International Law
thomas gammeltoft-hansen and tanja aalberts∗
8.1 Introduction
The notion of Europe being ‘flooded’ or ‘invaded’ by boat migrants is
one of the most often invoked examples by those arguing that globaliza-
tion is fundamentally eroding state sovereignty. In the wake of the current
global refugee crisis, hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants risk
their lives each year in the attempt to irregularly reach Europe. Many oth-
ers never make it that far. In 2016, more than 5000 migrant deaths were
recorded in the Mediterranean – accounting for nearly two-thirds of all
migrant fatalities worldwide.1 Given the clandestine nature of these cross-
ings, the real number may well be substantially higher.
From the perspective of European states, the irregular migrant has
become the embodiment of the inability to protect and control access to
that most sacred property of statehood, the sovereign territory. Hence,
maritime border controls have been expanded and transformed with
navy vessels, surveillance planes and radar stations creating a ‘virtual
border’ across the Mediterranean. In addition, transit and origin coun-
tries are increasingly conscripted to grant access to their territorial waters
or through their own authorities effect migration control on behalf of
∗ This chapter draws partly on two earlier publications: Tanja E. Aalberts and Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Sovereignty at Sea: The Law and Politics of Saving Lives in Mare
Liberum’ (2014) 17 Journal of International Relations and Development 439–468; Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Perfect Storm: Sovereignty Games and the Law and Politics of
Boat Migration’, in Violeta Moreno-Lax and Efthymios Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’
andMigrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach: IntegratingMaritime Security with Human
Rights (The Hague: Brill, 2016), pp. 60–79.
1 https://missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures.
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the European Union (EU) and its Member States.2 While these policies
involving maritime interception and international cooperation to prevent
migrants from departing are often framed in humanitarian terms – as
‘search and rescue’ operations intended to prevent the loss of lives at sea –
the fact is that these measures only tend to drive up prices and to force
migrants to take longer, more risky and dangerous journeys.3
The present chapter examines the different approaches pursued by
Mediterranean states in order to manage boat migrants and eschew
responsibility for people in distress at sea in the context of the maritime
‘search and rescue’ rules established as amatter of international law.Aswill
be shown, not only does the current politicization of migration issues in
Europe provide for evermore draconian policies, the particular legal geog-
raphy inwhich this issue is embedded also provide a particular apt case for
illustrating several of the different state strategies outlined in Chapter 1.
As a result, the boat migrant finds herself embedded in a complex inter-
national legal field, involvingmultiple bases for jurisdiction and interlock-
ing legal regimes in the context of rescue at sea and international human
rights law.Developments in both regimes have further taken place, leading
to processes of both de- and re-territorialization. This opens up a partic-
ular playing field between international law and politics, where states are
able to simultaneously capitalize on policy innovations and legal devel-
opments in order to address the political imperative of managing irreg-
ular migration. Over the last decades, the governments of the Mediter-
ranean have thus repeatedly locked horns over respective obligations
vis-à-vis migrants lost at sea, several claims have been made that neigh-
bouring countries were deliberately dumping rescuees in foreign territo-
rial waters or search and rescue regions, and regular testimonies by sur-
vivors report about both commercial vessels and navy ships ignoring pleas
to assist migrant boats in distress.4
2 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Global-
isation of Migration Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
3 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (eds), The Migration Industry
and the Commercialization of International Migration (London: Routledge, 2013). See also
www.borderdeaths.org/.
4 See e.g. Comisión Espanola deAyuda al Regiado, ‘Report onCertain Border Externalisation
Practices Pursues by the Spanish Government That Violate the Rights Both Now and in the
Future of ImmigrantsWhoMay Seek to Reach SpainVia the Southern Border’, 30May 2007.
Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati, ‘Report Regarding Recent Search and Rescue Operations
in the Mediterranean’, 1 June 2007.
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8.2 The Law and Politics of Saving Lives in theMare Liberum
Traditionally, the high seas are defined exactly as a space of non-
sovereignty.5 Since Grotius it has been accepted that the high seas can be
subject to no national jurisdictions and are governed by a residual princi-
ple of freedomallowing vessels of all nations the right of passage, trade and
exploitation.6 On the high seas different and fewer rules supposedly apply;
what happens here is not necessarily subordinated to the sovereign sphere
and national laws of a single state. This is the truly inter-national sphere,
containing both an inherent freedom to exercise sovereign power, but as a
result also innate potential for conflict in the absence of neat delineations
between competing claims.
To some extent, Grotius’s principle of the Mare Liberum survives to
this day. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas states that ‘[t]he high
seas being open to all States, no State may validly purport to subject any
part of them to its sovereignty’ (Art. 2) and it affords all states the same
basic freedoms of navigation, fishing, infrastructure and overflying.7 Yet,
despite its name, the Mare Liberum is hardly a space devoid of regula-
tion. The law of the sea imposes a complex set of norms on the maritime
environment, charting out a web of intersecting rights and obligations for
both states and private actors. Equally important, modern international
law provides for a host of competing and often overlapping claims in the
maritime environment, in which territorial waters, the contiguous zone,
nationality, flag state jurisdiction, nearest port of safety, next port of call,
and regional search and rescue zones may all be invoked for the purpose
of establishing authority or responsibilities.
5 As a matter of modern international law, a state’s territorial waters may extend twelve nau-
tical miles (twenty-two kilometres) from the baseline, which the low water mark or internal
waters (Art. 3 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in
force 1 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 397). This belt is regarded part of the state’s sovereign
territory for all purposes, save that international maritime law demands that states allow
foreign ships innocent passage. Certain sovereign functions may additionally be exercised
within an additional contiguous zone extending up to 24 miles from the low water mark.
While the contiguous zone is technically considered the high seas, states are allowed to exer-
cise control and checks to ‘prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sani-
tary laws and regulations’ (Art. 24(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contigu-
ous Zone, Geneva, 29April 1958, in force 10 September 1964, 516UNTS 205). Finally, states
may extend exclusive claims to e.g. fishing within the exclusive economic zone, extending
200 miles from the baseline (Art. 56 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea).
6 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1916).
7 Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958, in force 30 September 1962, 450
UNTS 11.
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In contrast, international human rights law normally presumes a binary
relationship between a single state and individuals within its jurisdiction.
The major achievement of the human rights movement was exactly to
introduce to international law a set of norms that did not simply con-
cern the horizontal relationship between states, but a vertical obligation
between each state and its subjects and aliens within its territory.8 This is
also reflected in the international refugee protection regime and the 1951
Refugee Convention. International refugee law deliberately shies away
from placing any obligations on the countries of origin,9 and despite a call
for international cooperation in the Convention’s preamble, the basic legal
mechanism for dividing responsibility among states remains individual-
ized and based on territorial proximity.10
Both the law of the sea and international human rights law impose obli-
gations upon states even outside their territorial waters. Grotius himself
underscored that the correlate of the sovereign freedom afforded on the
high seas is a common obligation to obey by ‘the law of hospitality which
is of the highest sanctity’.11 Both the duty to render assistance to migrants
and others lost at sea and to allow disembarkation of those rescued at a
place of safety are both old and universal norms of international law.12 In
their modern iteration, every state must require the captain of a ship fly-
ing its flag to ‘render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of
being lost’ and ‘to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons
in distress, if informed of their need of assistance’.13 Beyond imposing an
8 Henry Steiner, ‘International Protection of Human Rights’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.),
International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2006), 753–82, at 769; Sigrun
Skogly and Mark Gibney, ‘Transnational Human Rights Obligations’ (2002) 24 Human
Rights Quarterly 781–98, at 782
9 Indeed, certain refugee instruments have been explicit in stating that the granting of asy-
lum is not to be considered as an ‘unfriendly act’ towards countries of origin. See e.g. the
preamble of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum. UNGA resolution 2312 (XXII),
14 December 1967.
10 Arguably, certain later policy developments would seem to complicate this picture by
invoking competing jurisdictions through e.g. safe third-country and safe country of origin
policies.
11 Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, 1.
12 Both principles are considered international customary law as well as codified within the
global maritime search and rescue regime. See in particular Art. 98 in the Convention on
the Law of the Sea; the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London,
1 November 1974, in force 25 May 1980, 1184 UNTS 3; and the International Convention
on Maritime Search and Rescue, Hamburg, 27 April 1979, in force 22 June 1985, 1403
UNTS.
13 Art. 98(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea; Chapter V, Regulations 10(a) and
33 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. This entails a positive
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obligation for both official and private vessels to rescue anyone encoun-
tered in distress, coastal states further have a positive duty to maintain
‘an adequate and effective search and rescue service’ and to ensure co-
ordination of search and rescue operations.14 To that end the international
search and rescue regime has led to the division of the world’s oceans into
national search and rescue regions, within which each coastal state has
the primary responsibility for ensuring that distress calls are received and
responded to.15
In parallel, the corner-stone of international refugee law, the principle of
non-refoulement, requires states not to return in anymanner a personwith
a well-founded fear of persecution.16 While the non-refoulement princi-
ple has previously been interpreted as applying only to refugees who have
already arrived at a state’s territory, both international human rights law
and international refugee law has come to understand this principle to
apply wherever states exercise jurisdiction.17
For a long period, the issue of disembarkation and subsequent return
to the country of origin of persons rescued at sea was a nominally minor
issue mainly related to sailors. As such, the obligations imposed by inter-
national law in regard to boat migrants were seen as reciprocal and recon-
cilable to the perceived self-interest of relevant states. Similarly, the mod-
ern refugee protection regime came about as an attempt, albeit imperfect,
to resolve the problem of those occupying the undesirable and in systemic
terms impossible position in between mutually exclusive sovereign states.
During the first decades of the Cold War, receiving refugees was entailed
scoring ideological value for states, allowing people ‘to vote with their feet’
by admitting the enemies of one’s enemy.
A combination of several factors has fundamentally changed this pic-
ture, however. New refugee flows emerged from proxy wars fought in the
Global South in the 1980s.18 A decade before, the oil crisis meant that
obligation of flag states to adopt domestic legislation that imposes penalties on shipmas-
ters who ignore or fail to provide assistance, see Michael Pugh, ‘Drowning Not Waving:
Boat People and Humanitarianism at Sea’ (2004) 17 Journal of Refugee Studies 50–68. In
practice, however, many states have failed to do so and enforcement often remains difficult,
see Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy, ‘The Law of the Sea and Human Rights’ (2007) 19 Sri Lanka
Journal of International Law 85–107.
14 Art. 98(2) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
15 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as amended.
16 Art. 33(1) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS
2545.
17 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum, 94–99.
18 Laura Barnett, Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,
New Issues in Refugee Research no. 54, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
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most European countries abandoned their welcoming labour immigra-
tion schemes, placing additional stress on the asylum institution. And
at the same time, globalization allowed new patterns of migration and
refugee flight by air and by sea, leading to mixed flows of irregular
migrants, often facilitated by human smugglers specialized in avoiding
traditional forms of border control.19 Last, but not least, the advent of
large-scale boatmigration from refugee producing countriesmade receiv-
ing states concerned that asylum processing and protection responsibili-
ties would follow from search and rescue operations. As a result, the hith-
erto relatively trivial issue of disembarkation of those rescued became
politicized and subject to a variety of interpretations and resulting political
stalemates between states each arguing against taking responsibility.20
In this context, both the non-refoulement principle and the duty to per-
form search and rescue have come to constitute significant fetters upon
states’ prerogative to perform border controls. As the drafting committee
of the 1951 Refugee Convention made clear, the non-refoulement clause
constitutes ‘an exceptional limitation of the sovereign right of states to turn
back aliens to the frontiers of their country of origin’.21 As such, refugee
and human rights law require border officials to immediately address
those claiming to be in need of international protection before applying
any generalized measures to block or return irregular boat migrants. Sim-
ilarly, search and rescue rules are often triggered in the conduct of mar-
itime border control where migrant vessels are either deemed unseawor-
thy or capsize during the encounter, either deliberately as migrants seek
to provoke a rescue operation, or involuntarily if the weight of those on
board the often-overcrowded ships shifts too much to one side.22
Both legal regimes have sought to respond to this new reality. Within
international human rights law e.g. by expanding the application of the
non-refoulement principle and other human rights norms in situations
Geneva (2002); Aristide Zolberg, ‘Beyond the Crisis’, in Peter M. Benda and Aristide
Zolberg (eds), Global Migrants, Global Refugees (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 1–19.
19 Matthew J. Gibney and Randall Hansen, Asylum Policy in the West: Past Trends, Future
Possibilities, WIDER Discussion Paper, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, Finland (2003); Stephen
Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in
the Modern World, 3rd edn (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003).
20 Violeta Moreno-Lax and Efthymios Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at
Sea: A Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights (The
Hague: Brill, 2016).
21 Remark made by the Israeli delegate, Nehemiah Robinson. Ad Hoc Committee on State-
lessness and Related Problems. First Session, 20th meeting. E/AC.32/SR.20, para. 49.
22 Interview with Spanish naval captain, Las Palmas, 23 April 2007.
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where states perform migration control extra-territorially, and within
search and rescue by seeking to resolve issues relating to the division of
responsibilities and disembarkation for rescued migrants. Nonetheless,
legal developments have not necessarily resulted in better protection of
irregular boat migrants on the high seas, as evidenced by the growing
death toll23 and repeated political clashes in relation to this issue.
As will be argued in the following, rather than reducing the room for
politics, paradoxically the development and expansion of international
law on the high seas has enhanced the possibility of politicalmanoeuvring.
Context matters here. In comparison with terra firma, on the high seas
the precise division and content of the sovereign rights and obligations
are more open to interpretation and subject to varying interpretations. In
this space, a particular geopolitics emerges, in which the zonal divisions
of each state’s search and rescue obligations and territorial logics in regard
to asylum obligations clash with the more functional divisions of author-
ity and assertions of power pertaining to migration control at sea. As a
result, boat migrants find themselves subjected to an increasingly com-
plex field of governance, in which participating states may successfully
barter off and eschew their international obligations by reference to tradi-
tional norms of sovereignty and international law. Thus, rather than sim-
ply a space of non-sovereignty per se, the high seas become the venue for a
range of competing claims and disclaims to sovereignty and responsibility.
In the following, we identify a number of politico-legal strategies pur-
sued by states in this area, notably interpretive framing, regime shopping,
jurisdiction shopping and international cooperation.While developments
in both the law on search and rescue and international human rights law
intended to improve the protection of irregular migrants have changed
the modalities of these practices, the sovereignty game around search and
rescue remains in place.
8.3 The Politics of Interpretation
The political struggles over search and rescue are facilitated by the con-
tinued unclarity in terms of the international legal framework. While few
states have challenged the existence of search and rescue obligations at the
general level, several issues of how to interpret the more specific obliga-
tions remain hotly contested. Neither the 1979 Search and Rescue nor the
1974 Safety of Life at Sea conventions provide a solid definition of what
23 www.borderdeaths.org/.
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constitutes ‘distress’.24 Instead, the captain of the intercepting ship is given
authority to judge when a vessel is in need of rescue. Malta, for example,
appears to apply a particularly narrow definition, effectively distinguish-
ing between ‘being in need of rescue’ and general ‘unseaworthiness’ by
modern standards. According to a senior officer of the Armed Forces of
Malta, distress is defined as ‘the imminent danger of loss of lives, so if they
are sinking it is distress. If they are not sinking it is not distress’ and hence
no rescue operation is required.25
The problematic nature of this kind of discretion is compounded by
the unavailability of the regular accountability mechanisms that usually
accompanies such measures within the territory of liberal states. Com-
pared to themigrant or asylum seeker arriving at the territory of his or her
destination state, migrants who find themselves in distress or encounter
migration control on the high seas will have obvious difficulties in access-
ing NGOs, medias, lawyers, or relevant authorities to plea their case and
protection claims thus easily risk being ‘overheard’.26 Maltese authori-
ties have thus been accused of encouraging and even supplying migrant
boats with water and fuel to sail on to Italian waters and thereby ‘pass the
buck’.27
Secondly, disputes relate to the division of responsibilities. The search
and rescue regime entails the division of the high seas into geographical
24 Pugh, ‘Drowning Not Waving’, 58. The Search and Rescue Convention defines distress as
‘situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a vessel or a person is threatened by
grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance’. In 2012 the Parliamen-
tary Committee of the Council of Europe emphasized that a situation of distress should
be evaluated based on several factors, including the number of persons on board the ves-
sel relative to its size, the number of persons showing signs of distress and the distance of
the vessel from shore. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Lives Lost in the
Mediterranean Sea: Who Is Responsible?’, Doc. 12895 (2012).
25 Silja Klepp, ‘Illegal Migration and Migrant Fatalities in Malta’, paper presented at the
Human Cost of Border Control in the Context of EU Maritime Migration Systems, Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam, 25–27 October 2009.
26 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum, 209–30.
27 In August 2009, Italian authorities rescued a boat with five Eritreans close to Lampedusa.
The seventy-five other passengers originally on board had died of dehydration and starva-
tion during the three weeks the boat had been at sea. The survivors claimed that at least
ten ships had passed them by without rescuing them. In addition, the Italian Ministry of
the Interior accused Malta’s Maritime Squadron of spotting the boat two days prior to the
Italian interception. According to the survivors, theMaltese authorities had supplied them
with water and food supplies but not taken any steps to rescue them. A spokesperson from
Malta’s Armed Forces acknowledged that they had encountered the boat, but claimed the
vessel and passengers appeared to be ‘in very good shape’ and that themigrants had refused
assistance.; see further Repubblica, 22 August 2009.
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search and rescue regions, in which each coastal state maintains overall
responsibility for coordinating search and rescue operations. The impor-
tance of these zones was emphasized in the 2004 amendments to the
Search and Rescue and Safety of Life at Sea conventions.28 The amend-
ments specify that persons rescued at sea are to be taken to a place of
safety and the accompanying guidelines stress the importance of the non-
refoulement principle in that disembarkation should be avoided in ‘terri-
tories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear
of persecution would be threatened’.
At the same time, however, no direct obligation is placed upon states to
allow rescued persons’ access to their territory. Instead, contracting states
shall ‘co-ordinate and co-operate’ to ensure that a place of disembarka-
tion is found with a minimum further deviation from the ships’ intended
voyage whilst still respecting safety of life at sea. Where this does not hap-
pen on its own, a fall-back mechanism is inserted by noting that the state
‘responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is
rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such coordina-
tion and co-operation occurs’.29 This residual obligation places additional
emphasis on organizing disembarkation according to the existing division
of the high seas into national search and rescue regions, which has been
confirmed by the IMO Facilitation Committee.
If previously the law of the sea provided little guidance as to the resolu-
tion of conflicts overwhere rescued persons should be put ashore, the 2004
amendments implies a significant narrowing of the interpretative scope
towards placing responsibility to ensure disembarkation with the state
in charge of the SAR region. Under such an interpretation, carrying out
migration control and search and rescue operations within North African
states’ territorial waters and SAR regions naturally becomes an attractive
strategy for EU member states. Indeed, the intensified patrols by EU’s
border agency, Frontex, means that European patrol vessels are increas-
ingly operating inside foreign search and rescue regions in the Mediter-
ranean. Yet, if the above interpretation of disembarkation responsibilities
is accepted, the amended SAR regime establish a normative structure for
jurisdiction shopping. Barring any EU states offering disembarkation, the
28 Amendments to Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and
2–4 of the Annex to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, entry
into force 1 July 2006.
29 International Maritime Organization, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at
Sea, MSC.167(78), 20 May 2004, Principle 6.17.
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assumption would be that the respective third state would be responsible
for allowing disembarkation of persons rescued during operations taking
place within their search and rescue zone, and from then on presumably
take on any asylum claims or enforce returns to the country of origin.
International agreement on this issue is still not uniform, however, and
the language is clearly a compromise as indicated by the continued use
of softer language such as ‘coordinate’ and ‘should’ in the aforementioned
article in the IMO guidelines.30 Several states continue to dispute the SAR
regiondivisions or apply different interpretations in regard to disembarka-
tion. Malta, which maintains an excessively large SAR region (a remnant
of when Malta was under British colonial rule), has so far refused to rat-
ify the 2004 amendments for fears that it would impose unrealistic obli-
gations to disembark migrants rescued by other states and private ves-
sels. Malta instead maintains that the coordinating country’s obligation is
to disembark rescued persons at the ‘nearest safe port of call’.31 This has
led to further tensions between Malta and Italy following a series of inci-
dents where migrants were rescued in Malta’s SAR region yet were geo-
graphically closer to the Italian islands Lampedusa and Pantellaria than
Malta’s mainland. As neither country has been willing to allow disem-
barkation, the result has been lengthy stand-offs, in some cases leading
to migrant deaths, and a number of confrontations between Italian and
Maltese naval vessels literally trying to block each other from entering its
territorial waters and disembark rescued migrants.32
8.4 Regime Shopping
The high seas furthermore provide a rather different legal environment
than that normally encountered by migrants and refugees arriving at
the territory of a host state. As noted above, the refugee regime in
particular pays homage to the principle of territoriality. While the non-
refoulement principle is generally accepted to apply wherever states exer-
cise jurisdiction,33 it remains a reactive obligation in the sense that it
presupposes some kind of qualified contact between the state and the
30 See further Seline Trevisanut, ‘Search and Rescue Operations in theMediterranean: Factor
of Cooperation or Conflict?’ (2010) 25 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law
523–42.
31 Raphael Vassallo, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place’,Malta Today, 13 September 2009.
32 Derek Lutterbeck, ‘Migrants, Weapons and Oil: Europe and Libya after the Sanctions’
(2009) 14 The Journal of North African Studies 169–84.
33 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum, 94–99.
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asylum seeker. The importance of territorial delineations becomes even
more evident when moving past this fundamental obligation and looking
at thewider set of protections guaranteed by the international refugee pro-
tection regime. The rights stemming from the 1951 Refugee Convention
are not granted en bloc, but rather progressively according to the ‘level of
attachment’ a refugee obtains to a given country. Thus, the more sophisti-
cated rights, such as access to welfare, employment and legal aid, are only
granted when the refugee is ‘lawfully staying’ or ‘durably resident’ in the
territory of the host state. Conversely, refugees or asylum seekers who are
not present in a state’s territory but nonetheless under its jurisdiction, such
as on the high seas or in the territory of a third state, are only entitled to a
basic set of rights centred around the non-refoulement obligation.34
The incremental approach reflects a sensible concern of the drafters not
to immediately extend the full scope of rights in situations where refugees
may arrive spontaneously in large numbers.35 Yet, at a time when several
states are moving both migration control and asylum processing offshore,
this notion of progressive realization of rights risks being cut short, as
refugees and asylum seekers may never reach the territory of the acting
state.
In contrast with the territorial focus of refugee law, the law of the sea is
generally informed by a ‘functional’ logic.36 The law of the sea accepts that
certain prerogatives short of full sovereignty may be projected beyond the
state’s territorial jurisdiction. This includes the right to exercise migration
control within the 24-mile contiguous zone,37 and the extension of exclu-
sive claims to e.g. fishing within the exclusive economic zone, extending
200 miles from the baseline.38
In the context of boat migrants, this shift creates a pretext for politi-
cal attempts to sever the bond between authority and responsibility, leav-
ing states free to assert sovereign prerogatives in regard to migration
34 Themost pertinent rights under the Refugee Convention that are specifically grantedwith-
out reference to being present or staying at the territory include Art. 33 (non-refoulement),
Art. 16 (access to courts) and Art. 3 (non-discrimination). Somewhat more specific and
limited in their extraterritorial remit Arts. 13 (property), Act. 22 (education) and Act. 20
(rationing) also apply extraterritorially. JamesHathaway,TheRights of Refugees under Inter-
national Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 160ff.
35 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, 157ff.
36 Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2007); Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment: The Rules
of Decision (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
37 Art. 24(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
38 Art. 56 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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control without taking on the correlate duties that would normally flow
from international refugee and human rights law. This argument was
made most clearly by the Italian government in the Hirsi case.39 The case
concerned Italy’smuch-criticized interception programme in cooperation
with Libya from 2009 to 2011. The Italian government claimed that even
though the applicants had been brought on board Italian navy vessels –
something that will normally trigger the state’s jurisdiction40 – the Ital-
ian authorities had not exercised ‘absolute and exclusive control’41 over
the applicants, but merely carried out a search and rescue operation on
the high seas in accordance with its obligations under the law of the sea.
According to the government:
The Italian ships had confined themselves to intervening to assist the three
vessels in distress and ensuring the safety of the persons on board. They had
then accompanied the intercepted migrants to Libya in accordance with
the bilateral agreements of 2007 and 2009. The Government argued that
the obligation to save human lives on the high seas, as required under the
Montego Bay Convention, did not in itself create a link between the State
and the persons concerned establishing the State’s jurisdiction.42
Such attempts towards ‘regime shopping’ in order to escape human rights
obligations are far from limited to maritime interception.43 Yet, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has so far rejected that parallel obligations
under international law – whether part of bilateral and regional arrange-
ments or under multilateral treaties – can displace a state’s human rights
obligations.44 In the Hirsi case, it did so by making exactly the opposite
argument, namely that general international law supported a finding of
39 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 27765/09.
23 February 2012.
40 Medvedyev and Others v. France. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 3394/03.
29 March 2010 GC; Xhavara and fifteen v. Italy and Albania. European Court of Human
Rights. Appl. no. 39473/98. 11 January 2001 (admissibility).
41 Hirsi, ibid., para. 64. See further Chapter 3, this volume. 42 Hirsi, ibid., para. 65.
43 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jens Vedsted-Hansen (eds),Human Rights and the Dark
Side of Globalisation: Transnational Law Enforcement and Migration Control (London:
Routledge, 2016).
44 In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights. Appl.
no. 61498/08. 2 March 2010), the UK government thus argued that that it was under a
bilateral legal obligation to transfer the applicant to the Iraqi authorities, even though such
a transfer might constitute refoulement in relation to Art. 2, as there was a serious risk that
they would be subjected to the death penalty. While the European Court of Human Rights
acknowledged that ‘the Convention should be interpreted as far as possible in harmony
with other principles of international law . . . [and] . . . recognises the importance of inter-
national cooperation’ (para. 126), it rejected this claim, arguing that ‘Article 1 makes no
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human rights jurisdiction, and that obligations in relation to different bod-
ies of international law applied cumulatively:
The Court observes that by virtue of the relevant provisions of the law of
the sea, a vessel sailing on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the State of the flag it is flying. This principle of international law has
led the Court to recognise, in cases concerning acts carried out on board
vessels flying a State’s flag, in the same way as registered aircraft, cases of
extra-territorial exercise of the jurisdiction of that State [ . . . ] Where there
is control over another, this is de jure control exercised by the State in ques-
tion over the individuals concerned.
. . .
Moreover, Italy cannot circumvent its ‘jurisdiction’ under the Conven-
tion by describing the events at issue as rescue operations on the high seas.
In particular, the Court cannot subscribe to the Government’s argument
that Italy was not responsible for the fate of the applicants on account of
the allegedly minimal control exercised by the authorities over the parties
concerned at the material time.45
However important the Hirsi judgment was from a human rights per-
spective, it is unlikely to prove the end of political manoeuvring to avoid
human rights obligations in the context of maritime search and rescue.
Following the overturn of the Tunisian government, Italy was quick to
negotiate a new agreement to deploy its naval assets in international waters
north of Tunisia’s coastline.46 Yet in contrast to the Libya scheme, Italy’s
role is in this case limited to notifying its Tunisian counterparts whenever
migrant vessels are leaving the coast. As it is Tunisia’s authorities under-
taking the interception before the boats leave territorial waters, Italy thus
claims to avoid triggering any direct human rights responsibility.47
distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any part of
the Contracting Party’s “jurisdiction” from scrutiny under the Convention’ (para. 128).
45 Hirsi, ibid., paras 77 and 79.
46 Ministry of the Interior, ‘Siglato l’Accordo tra Italia e Tunisia’, press release, 6 April 2011.
Available from www.interno.it. See further Matteo Tondini, ‘The Legality of Intercepting
Boat People under Search and Rescue and Border Control Operations with Reference to
Recent Italian Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea and the Ecthr Decision in the Hirsi
Case’ (2012) 18 Journal of International Maritime Law 59074, at 74
47 Customary international law does establish principles whereby a secondary responsibil-
ity may fall upon Italy for ‘aiding or assisting’ another state in the commission of an
internationally wrongful act. See in particular the International Law Commission, Arti-
cles on State Responsibility, Art. 16. Yet, in practice this sort of indirect obligation has
proved difficult to invoke in regard to human rights, and it demands that both states are
bound by the same international treaties. See Tom de Boer, ‘Closing Legal Black Holes:
The Role of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Refugee Rights Protection’ (2014) 28 Jour-
nal of Refugee Studies 118–34 and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James C. Hathaway,
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Vice versa, for an institution such as the European Court of Human
Rights, precedent is likely to structure the ongoing development of inter-
pretation in this area. Even if a more ‘functional’ approach to estab-
lishing extra-territorial responsibility may be finding its way into the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,48 existing case
law retains a strong affinity to territoriality principles,49 resulting in the
rather strenuous tests for ‘effective control over territory’ and ‘personal
authority’ that are likely to exclude certain instances of offshore migration
control.50
8.5 Marketization and Jurisdiction Shopping
Third and finally, the boat migrant is caught up in a more general shift
towards neoliberal governance. As aforementioned, migration control is
traditionally considered an inalienable sovereign function of the state.
Yet today, migration management is fast becoming a key foreign policy
issue or even commodity, where deals are being struck between developed
states and the countries of origin and transit.51 In February 2017 Italy,
backed by the EU Council, concluded an agreement with Libya’s GNA
government, promising to provide both funding and equipment to Libya’s
struggling coastguard in exchange for the fragile government’s support in
‘Non-refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence’ (2015) 53(2) Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law 235–85, at 267ff.
48 See e.g. Pad and Others v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 60167/00.
28 June 2007 and Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom. European Court of Human
Rights. Appl. no. 55721/07. 7 July 2011, para. 135. See further Gammeltoft-Hansen and
Hathaway, ‘Non-Refoulement’, 266ff.
49 Notably Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey and the UK. European Court of Human Rights. Appl. no. 5207/99. 12 Decem-
ber 2001 (Grand Chamber). For critique see e.g. Erik Roxstrom, Mark Gibney and Terje
Einarsen, ‘The Nato Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of
Western Human Rights Protection’ (2005) 23 Boston University International Law Journal
56–136; Rick Lawson, ‘Life after Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights’, in Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga (eds),
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004), 83–123.
50 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum, 100–157.
51 Aderanti Adepoju, Femke Van Noorloos and Annelies Zoomers, ‘Europe’s Migration
Agreements with Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: A Critical Review’
(2010) 48 International Migration 42–75; Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich,Migra-
tion after the Arab Spring, Migration Policy Centre Research Report 2012/09, September
2012.
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stopping boat migrants towards Europe.52 Likewise, the 2015 EU-Turkey
agreement involved both cooperation on migration control and a return
arrangement for asylum seekers arriving in Greece in exchange for the EU
speeding up accession talks, visa liberalization, resettlement spaces and a
total of 3 billion Euros to provide refugee assistance in Turkey.53 The polit-
ical backdrop for theHirsi case mentioned above was the 2007 agreement
between Italy and Libya, promising the latter US$5 billion if the Gaddafi
regime would set up radar detection facilities on Libya’s shores and work
with Italy to prevent the departure of unauthorized migrants.54 Outside
Europe, Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ saw that country woo the island state
of Nauru with offers of free medical care, educational opportunities and
sports ovals in return for thewarehousing inNauru of boatmigrants inter-
cepted byAustralia.55 That deal was the genesis for subsequent outreach to
other neighbouring states, including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea,56
intended to prevent boats carrying migrants from travelling towards
Australia.
The above examples may be seen as evidence of an increasing ‘mar-
ketization of migration management’, in which global migration gover-
nance are increasingly adopting the methods and values of the market
52 Nikolaj Nielsen, ‘Italy and Libya CutMigrant Busting Deal’, EUObserver, 3 February 2017,
https://euobserver.com/migration/136781; Council of the European Union, ‘Malta Dec-
laration by the Members of the European Council on the External Aspects of Migration:
Addressing the Central Mediterranean Route’, 3 February 2017.
53 The Agreement builds on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan of 15 October 2015.
54 The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya was
signed on 30 August 2008 and entered into force on 2 March 2009. Cooperation under
the treaty was halted in March 2011 following the NATO bombing campaign. See fur-
ther Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat
Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, New
York, September 2009, 24; ThomasGammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Externalisation of European
Migration Control and the Reach of International Refugee Law’, in Elspeth Guild and Paul
Minderhoud (eds), The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law (Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2012), 273–98.
55 TaraMagner, ‘The Less Than “Pacific” Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia’ (2004) 16
International Journal of Refugee Law 53–90.
56 In July 2013 Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia signed a bilateral agreement to
process and resettle an uncapped number of asylum seekers in PNG, to be funded by
Australia but administered by PNG. As well as funding the entire arrangement, Australia
announced a suite of additional development assistance programmes to the developing
state. Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea,
signed in Brisbane 19 July 2013; Helen Brown, Indonesia to change visa requirements for
Iranians entering the country following request from PMKevin Rudd, Australian Broadcast-
ing Commission, 19 July 2013, www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-18/indonesia-to-change-
visa-requirements-for-iranians/4829434.
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to guide policy development and implementation. This marketization is
premised on a combination of jurisdiction shopping and commercial-
ization of sovereignty itself. As certain states are keen to outsource the
less palatable aspects of governments, such as migration control, oth-
ers states are making their territory and/or authorities available for the
same purpose in exchange for funds, development assistance, trade privi-
leges, labour migration quotas or some other form of compensation. The
result is that sovereign prerogatives, territory and functions are strategi-
cally traded and commodified among states and between governments.57
The introduction of such market-based logics into the migration field
have deep-seated and troubling consequences for themigrants affected. In
terms of human rights accountability, jurisdiction shopping may be seen
to achieve a geographic, political and/or legal distancing of the less palat-
able aspects of migration governance away from the sponsoring state. In
the patchwork of national refugee and human rights jurisdictions, shift-
ing the legal geography and/or government responsible for carrying out
migration control may simultaneously reduce the acting state’s protection
responsibilities and shift legal obligations to third states whose ‘human
rights obligations are either lower, less extensive or less precise than those
of the destination State’.58 Sponsoring states have not shied away from
cooperating with non-parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, such as
Libya and Indonesia. Indeed, Nauru’s then non-party status may have
been part of the reason for Australia choosing it as a place for offshore
asylum processing in 2001.59 Papua New Guinea is party to the Conven-
tion but maintains several reservations, affecting core rights, such as non-
penalization and freedom of movement, as well as refugees’ standard of
treatment in regard to housing, employment and education.60
As in the above case, both domestic jurisprudence and developments
in international human rights law have made inroads to counter this
dynamic. For example, the Australian High Court struck down the
57 Ronen Palan, ‘TaxHavens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty’ (2002) 56 Inter-
national Organization 151–76; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Vedsted-Hansen, Human Rights
and the Dark Side of Globalisation.
58 Gregor Noll, ‘The Politics of Saving Lives: Interception, Search and Rescue and the Ques-
tion of Human Rights at Sea’, paper presented at the Future of Asylum Policy in the Euro-
pean Union, Turku, 10 October 2006.
59 Nauru acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the
1967 Protocol on 28 June 2011.
60 Diana Glazebrook, ‘Papua New Guinea’s Refugee Track Record and Its Obligations under
the 2013 Regional Resettlement Arrangement with Australia’, SSGM Discussion Paper
2014/3, Australian National University.
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government’s scheme to relocate asylum seekers arriving irregularly by
boat to Malaysia.61 In doing so, the court lent support to the general
interpretative principle under the 1951 Refugee Convention that a state
may only transfer an asylum seeker to a third state if equivalent ‘effec-
tive protection’ is provided there.62 More generally, international human
rights law jurisprudence has developed to accept shared and differentiated
responsibility in a range of situations relevant to international cooperation
on migration control and asylum processing.63
Even so, the market dynamic may in itself be argued to produce ‘nega-
tive externalities’ for themigrant. As in the case of privatization, the intro-
duction of a third-party profitmotive intomigrationmanagement is likely
to lead to cost-cutting,64 and third states may thus be unwilling or unable
to make good on promises to ensure effective human rights protection.
While this is often suppressed at the political level, it is a foreseeable con-
sequence. The efficiency of a market economy is premised on a feedback
loop from consumers to suppliers: if consumers do not like the product,
they will not buy it. Yet, the marketization of migration control represents
a third-party provider economy, where the end-users (migrants) are not
the same as the customers (sponsoring states) footing the bill. Migrants
themselves do not get a voice in this equation and oversight and account-
abilitymechanisms as part of these schemes are equally lacking. The result
is a ‘rights economy’ in which human rights and refugee protection is
either sought realized at the lowest possible cost or disbanded altogether.65
8.6 Understanding the Politics of Law in Regard to Rescue at Sea
Howcanwe account for the developments of the SARand SOLAS regimes,
and their impact on the encounter between irregular boat migrants and
61 Plaintiffs M70/2011 and M106 of 2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘the
Malaysia-Swap Arrangement case’) [2011] HCA 32.
62 Susan Kneebone, ‘The Bali Process and Global Refugee Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region’
(2014) 27 Journal of Refugee Studies 596–618; Michelle Foster, ‘Protection Elsewhere: The
Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in Another State’ (2007) 28
Michigan Journal of International Law 223–86, at 230–31; Stephen H. Legomsky, ‘Sec-
ondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The
Meaning of Effective Protection’ (2003) 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 567–667,
at 570.
63 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, ‘Non-Refoulement’, 272ff.
64 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen, The Migration Industry.
65 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Outsourcing Asylum: The Advent of Protection Lite’, in
Luiza Bialasiewicz (ed.), Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of European
Space (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), 129–52.
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sovereign authorities on the high seas? At face value it might fit a gover-
nance framework, characterized by transnational dynamics, the evapora-
tion of boundaries, a growing interdependence between a plurality of state
and non-state actors, and the thickening of international regimes and reg-
ulation.Within such a framework the emphasis is on the linkages between
formally equal members of the international society (networks of inter-
dependence), whose dealings with each other regarding shared problems
take place on an equal footing, without relying on centralized, hierarchical
and coercive authority structures to create international order. In this view
governance is conceived as rescuing the international community from
‘sovereignty’s worst instincts’.66 Sovereignty is, in this case, conceived in
terms of autonomy and freedom, and works – like traditional conceptions
of power – as a zero-sum game.67
Yet, such an understanding misses out on the more intricate relation-
ship between sovereignty, power and international law, between freedom,
rule and responsibility, that seem to be at play in the encounter between
sovereigns and boat migrants at the high seas. The amendments to the
SAR and SOLAS conventions do not just connote a development from the
international law of co-existence to the international law of cooperation68
regarding rescue at sea that limits and/or ‘tames’ state freedom in the
Mare Liberum. Rather, the cooperative regime in the international realm
involves a transformation of the logic of politics and the functioning of
power itself in relation to states as the simultaneous masters and subjects
of international law.69
Crucially, this functioning of power is not separate from the legal realm
but part and parcel of the manifestation of sovereign identity as it is
embedded in international legal regime at play. In case of the SAR regime,
it is the ongoing normative developments that provide the context within
which the sovereignty game at the high seas is carried out. For example,
the zonal divisions of the Mare Liberum through the search and rescue
regime not only replicate the powerful imaginary of territorial jurisdic-
tion, but equally can be conceived as a particular way of governing the
high seas by linking freedom with responsibility.
66 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005), 1.
67 See further Chapter 2, this volume.
68 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1964).
69 Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, ‘The International as Governmentality’ (2007)
35Millennium 677–701.
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Together this leads to a different analytics of the politics of law in
the context of the high seas. International law does not necessarily work
through liberal internalization and socialization processes,70 nor is it a
redundant normative layer to the rationalist sovereignty game where the
key players are conceived as atomistic subjects that pursue their self-
interested strategies regardless of the international normative context in
which they encounter each other.71 Rather, as we argued in the above, it
is precisely because of the normative patchwork established by the search
and rescue regime, human rights and refugee law that sovereign states take
pains to disclaim their sovereignty, rather than jealously guard it. It is pre-
cisely the increasing codification of the international realm, including the
high seas, that at once creates the necessity of disclaiming practices and
provides the tools to do so.
In the encounter between European authorities and migrants on the
high seas, the sovereign in other words makes use of the discretion to
interpret legal rules and/or apply different legal regimes and thus seek
redefine and demarcate its sovereign responsibility under these diverse
systems of rules and regimes.
8.7 Conclusion
The high seas remain one of the few places on earth not subject to a
national sovereign legal order, which could be said to make the legal
framework rather thin, both legally and, especially, institutionally. The
lack of a domestic legal order makes shifts between different legal regimes
easier and subject to less oversight and means for resolution. Enforcing
and monitoring the application of maritime regimes thus becomes inher-
ently difficult. The lack of legal clarity and protection of migrant lives
have led some scholars to describe the situation in theMediterraneanwith
regard to search and rescue as the ‘Wild West’.72
It would be misguided, however, to think of the high seas as a space
of legal exception per se. The law of the sea, international human right
law and EU law together provide a normative framework for governance,
albeit with somewhat different arrangements of the relationship between
70 See e.g.Martha Finnemore andKathryn Sikkink, ‘InternationalNormDynamics andPolit-
ical Change’ (1998) 52 International Organization 887–917.
71 See e.g. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999).
72 Derek Lutterbeck, ‘Small Frontier Island: Malta and the Challenge of Irregular Migraiton’
(2009) 20Mediterranean Quarterly 119–41, at 131.
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autonomy and responsibility for states engaged in migration control and
search and rescue in the Mediterranean. In this chapter, we have tried to
show how a geopolitics of the Mare Liberum is thereby created through
which states may seek to disclaim responsibilities through different
strategies, notably regime shopping, legal interpretation and jurisdiction
shopping.
While from the perspective of governments these strategies are all
coached and enacted in the language of international law, the result eas-
ily appears exactly opposite from the perspective of the boat migrant.
Rather than creating a dense net that will provide for a better protection of
migrants and refugees, the codification of theMare Liberum has simulta-
neously created loopholes that enable states to barter off their sovereignty
at the expense of their responsibility towards those in distress at sea. Con-
sequently, the boat migrant far too often find herself no longer caught in
it and consequently out of legality altogether.73
73 Hannah Arendt, ‘The Perplexities of the Rights of Man’, in Peter Baehr (ed.), The Portable
Hannah Arendt (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 31–45, at 34ff.
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